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reader is probably wondering how difficult it would be to bring such
a plan into effect and more likely than not, may view this plan in a
pessimistic manner. However one's attitude may be changed upon
examination of the realistic steps that have already been taken by
some states, even before the decision in Tate was rendered. A recent
statute enacted by Delaware,59 whereby a person is placed in a
specific means of employment which enables him to adequately satisfy
his fine, could well serve as a model for future state legislatures to
follow.
The installment or deferred method of payment satisfies all the
relevant factors which need to be taken into consideration. The state
is economically benefited. Penological interests and sentencing motivations are advanced. More important, however, the indigent defendant's
constitutional rights are protected. Under such an alternative plan,
the indigent receives equal treatment-he has a choicel
John W. Oakley

FAmImy LAw-ALimoNY AND PROPERTy RESTORATIO- -A RESTATEMN.

-The problems of divorce, alimony,' and property settlement are
drawing increasing attention as legalists and theologians alike begin
59 DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 11, § 4106(b) (Supp. 1970). This statute reads in
pertinent part as follows:
Where a person sentenced to pay a fine, cost or both, on conviction of a
crime is unable or fails to pay such fine, costs or both, at the time of
imposition of sentence or in accordance with the terms of payment set
by the court, the court may order the person to report during regular
work days to the Director of Division of Corrections of the Department of
Health & Social Service, or a person designated by him, for work for a
number and schedule of days necessary to discharge the fine imposed.
The Division may approve public work projects for assignment of convicted persons.... The Director of the Division, or a person designated
by him, may also assign a convicted person to a private employer provided
the private employer shall compensate the convicted person at a rate of
pay no less than that normally paid to employees performing the same
or similar services for such an employer. The Division of Corrections
shall compensate any convicted person assigned to work under the supervision of any State, County or municipal agencies at a rate of pay equal
to that normally paid to employees performing the same or similar
services . .. The Division shall withhold from or require payment from
the periodic earnings of the convicted person all amounts not deemed by
the Division to be required to sustain the convicted person.

. .

. The

amount withheld shall be paid over to the State to be applied to the fine
and costs imposed until fully paid.
I "Alimony" is derived from the Latin alimonia, literally "sustenance." It is
used to denote that amount of money paid by one spouse (usually the husband)
to the other for support during and/or after a divorce proceeding. W. WiNrm,
ThE NEW CALIFoRmIA DuvoncE LAw 81 (1969). See also 24 Am. Jun. 2d Divorce
and Separation § 600 (1966).
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to realize that the archaic rules inherited from the ecclesiastical courts
of common law England are, at most, of questionable value. The
recent case of Colley v. Colley2 purports to "correct, clarify, and
restate"3 that area of the law as it is used and abused in Kentucky.
The worth of this restatement can only be adequately measured by
objectively comparing it with recent attempts in other jurisdictions to
cope with these problems.
While the Colley case is not entirely typical of most divorce
litigation,4 the facts in the case do reflect the recurring themes that
appear to thread their way through case after case in this area of the
law. The Colleys had been married for twenty-two years and had
two children, one in college, the younger at home. Mr. Colley was an
elected official of the county, and had interests in several small businesses in the area. Mrs. Colley had taught school for eighteen of her
twenty-two married years and had contributed her earnings of
$38,991.78 to household maintenance. The fundamental cause of the
marital breakdown is virtually impossible to determine from the record,
however the significant judicial conflict was centered around the basic
questions of alimony and property settlement.5 In essence, the trial
judge determined what value would be assigned to Mr. Colley's estate
($148,800) and then awarded his wife one-third in lump-sum alimony, 6
a one-half interest in their residence, and child support. Mr. Colley
appealed on the grounds that the award was excessive. The Court
allowed his appeal and remanded the case for a redetermination of
the financial obligations of the parties on the evidentiary issue of the
trial judge's improper use of judicial notice in the determination of
value of Mr. Colley's estate. The Court did not stop there however:
"We have concluded that we should reconsider the contradictory, confusing, and unrealistic state of our case law in this field as it has
painfully developed. We propose to redefine the guidelines for the
trial bench and the practicing bar to follow." In examining this reconsideration of the law, it is necessary to first take a brief look at
2460 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1970).
3Id.at 823.

4 Actually, most couples cannot afford divorce, and while it is true that the
upper-middle, and upper class divorce cases draw the most public attention (and
are more likely to end up in the Court of Appeals) the fact is that the vast
majority of marital breakdowns occur in families of the lower income ranges.
Additionally it is also a fact that a majority of divorces occur during the first
few years o? marriage, with year number three being the peak year. Foster and
Freed, Divorce American Style, 383 ANNA. 71, 82 (1969). See M. PLoscowE,
THE

TRurH ABotr DrvoRCE 194 (1955).

GPloscowe, Alimony, 383 AmNN~s 13, 14 (1969).
6 Id.at 18; see K. and I. DoNNErsoN, MARRim TODAY, SINGLE ToMorow 111
(1969); Hofstadter and Herzog, Common Sense About Alimony, HAmR'ss MAGAziE, May, 1958, at 68-70 [hereinafter cited as Hofstadter and Herzog].
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divorce, alimony, and7 property settlements as they came to us from
English common law.

"In England, from the early seventeenth century until 1857, there
was no absolute divorce [a vinculo] except by act of Parliament.""
Divorce a mensa et thoro, legal separation, was obtainable in the
ecclesiastical courts, and alimony was often granted to the needy
wife incident to such a decree. 9 In these cases, the marriage continued
to exist and, consequently, the husband's obligation to support remained. This duty to support the wife arose from the particular
property laws of the time, under which the husband was given control over all the real property owned by the wife before marriage, or
acquired subsequently. 0 Because he was legally entitled to all rents
and profits from that realty, the wife was virtually helpless without
his support. The courts imposed this obligation on the husband, and
since the usufruct privilege (control of the rents and profits) was not
altered by the granting of a divorce a mensa et thoro, the courts
reasoned that the husband's support obligation incurred at marriage
should likewise continue."- This obligation was discharged in the
form of periodic payments called alimony. Thus, the concept of alimony was tied only to the divorce a mensa et thoro and the husband's
duty of support. In the case of a divorce a vincula, the husband's
control over his former wife's property was destroyed, and along with
it, his correlative duty to support her.12 When this concept of alimony
was incorporated by the American judiciary, it became appreciably
altered. 13 The development of alimony in Kentucky is concisely traced
in Judge Osborne's dissenting opinion in Reed v. Reed.1 4 The original
statutes were properly interpreted at first to be a grant of power to the
Court to award alimony only after a legal separation, not after an
For a complete historical analysis and tracing of the development of divorce
law, see Foster and Freed, supra note 4, at 71-88.
8Mueller, Inquiry into the State of a Divorceless Society, 18 U. Prrr. L. REv.
545, 550-51 (1957); see also 2 H. FosTmI and D. Fnxs, LAw AND THE FAMy,
vi-vii (1966) [hereinafter cited as Fosram-FREED].
9 FosTEm-FRm at vii; Comment, 28 Ky. L.J. 233-34 (1939-1940). See also
Reed v. Reed, 457 S.W.2d 4, 12 (Ky. 1969).
10 See Paulsen, Support Rights and Duties, 9 VAND. L. Ruv. 709-10 (1956).
11
FosTx.-Fnanm at vii. See also Reed v. Reed, 457 S.W.2d 4, 12 (Ky. 1969);
Ploscow, supra note 4, at 184.
12 See generally,Foster and Freed, supra note 4, at 72-73.
13
FosTER-FREED at vii.
Apparently without much consideration being given to the reciprocal
aspect of alimony, American courts adopted and applied that obligation
to the totally different situation of an absolute divorce and to cases where
there was no actual need. The fact that Married Women's Property
Acts and similar legislation had changed the legal status of wives so that
no longer did husbands by marriage acquire ownership, control, or
management of their property, was disregarded.
14 457 S.W.2d 4, 12-15 (Ky. 1969).
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absolute divorce. The 1852 statute 0 (essentially the same as section
403.060 of our present Kentucky Revised Statutes [hereinafter cited as
KRS] allowed only a restoration of property and a limited property
settlement after a divorce decree. The case of Canine v. Canine16 in
1891 substantially altered this by allowing, for the first time, periodic
alimony payments where the husband did not have an estate large
17
enough to support a fair property settlement. This case now appears
to have been a basic misinterpretation of the law. By interpreting
"estate" so as to include the husband's future earning potential, the
Court succeeded in confusing the two areas of property settlement and
alimony to the point where, eighty years later, the same Court felt
compelled to devote almost an entire opinion to an attempt to "clarify"
the situation.
Just what does the Colley opinion say? The Court first notes the
two modem statutes which "have been the sources of the difficulty:"' s
KRS § 403.060(1), the "alimony statute," and KRS § 403.065-the
"restoration of property statute." The Court's proposition is this:
[O]ur construction of the restoration of property statute is as
impermissibly narrow and overextended as our construction of the
alimony statute is overexpansive and not warranted by the statutory
language. 19
The explanation of this thesis forms the basis for the guidelines laid
down subsequently in the Court's opinion.
In stating that the alimony statute is overexpanded and unwarranted by the wording itself, the Court refers to Judge Osborne's dissent
in Reed. It was his conclusion that since the Canine case, the alimony
statute has been judicially distended far beyond its original legislative
boundaries. 20 In the case of Davis v. Davis the Court awarded alimony
to the wife, even though the divorce was granted to her husband.
This was in conflict with the statute, as it allowed alimony only "on
a divorce obtained by her." Then, in Tilton v. Tilton2 ' the Court went
even further by holding that if the wife is granted the divorce, alimony
15 Upon final decree of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, the parties
shall be restored such property, not disposed of at the commencement of the suit,
as either obtained from or through the other before or during the marriage, in
consideration or by reason thereof; and if the wife have not sufficient estate of her
own she may, on a divorce obtained by her, have such allowances out of that of
her husband as shall be deemed equitable. Tm REMs STATUTES OF KEI.mCKY,

ch. XLVII, Art. 1I & 6 (1852).
16 16 S.W. 367 (Ky. 1891).

17 Acknowledgment to that "modem" phenomenon of "20-20 hindsight."
18 Colley v. Colley, 460 S.W.2d 821, 825 (Ky. 1970).
19 Id. at 825.
2
o Reed v. Reed, 457 S.W.2d 4, 14 (Ky. 1969).
2129 S.W. 290 (Ky. 1895).
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follows as a matter of right.22 This completely ignored the statutory
23
provision that the wife must not have sufficient estate of her own.
The case of Heustis v. Heustis24 is cited in the Reed dissent as an
example of the result of this continued judicial expansion of the alimony statute. In that case, the husband was granted the divorce from
his wife who had made no legal contribution to his estate through
work or money. And yet, the Court gave the wife one-third of the
husband's estate in alimony. Judge Osborne concludes in Reed: "The
Heustis case is so completely in conflict with the statute as to make
25
the two irreconcilable."
This over-expansion of the alimony statute beyond its original
bounds did not, however, take place in a vacuum. It can be traced
directly to the narrow interpretation and over-extension of the restoration of property statute. The restoration statute was an attempt
by the legislature to soften the harsh impact of the common law on
the property rights of married women. The husband, under the common law property rules, was said to "own" his wife's personal property, 26 and thus, upon dissolution of the marriage, the property would
go to the husband because he had legal title. All the statute sought to
do was require that each spouse return gifts received from the other
by reason of the marriage (this would obviously include the wife's
realty). Thus, the over-all goal was to put each spouse back, as nearly
2
The case law, however,
as possible, in his or her original conditionY.
went beyond this narrow construction and proceeded to extend coverage of the statute to that property acquired by a joint effort of both
parties during the marriage. 28 Because the wife's earnings usually go
toward family expenses and thus help the husband to save his money
for property investment, 29 the legal or titular interest in the property
is often in him. Accordingly, extending the statute to a coverage of
this property would necessarily lead to a restoration and vesting of
22 "We understand the rule to be that, in an action for divorce, the right to
Tilton v. Tilton, 29
alimony will follow if the wife is granted the divorce.
S.W. 290 (Ky. 1895).
23 Reed v. Reed, 457 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1969). The court stated:
Because of confusion as to the nature of the award being made and by
extending the rules originated in the Tilton Davis and Canine cases, the
court became more lax in its awards of alimony 'and paid less and less
attention to the provisions of the Act itself. Id. at 14.
24 346 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1961).
25
Reed v. Reed, 457 S.W.2d 4, 15 (Ky. 1969) (footnote omitted).
26
Paulsen, supra note 10, at 709.
2
7 R. PxTr.u, KENTucKY FAmLY LAw 359 (1969); see Cooke v. Cooke, 449
S.W.2d
28 216 (Ky. 1969). v. Woford, 103 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. 1937).
See, e.g., Woford
29 Id.at 299.
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complete title in the husband, even though the wife had substantially,
but indirectly, contributed to its acquisition.
Faced with this impossible situation, the Court began to look about
for different ways to circumvent this unintended application of the
statute. If it could not equitably divide the estate in the property
settlement, the Court soon found that it could expand the alimony
statute so as to make the overall settlement more fair.30 Thus, the
narrow interpretation and over-extension of the restoration of property
statute led directly to the over-expansion of the alimony statute in an
effort to compensate. 31 This resulted in creating the "legal fictions"
32
noted and explained by the Court in the Colley opinion.
In an attempt to provide an accurate construction of the statutory
provisions, the Court in Colley set forth certain basic guidelines for
trial judges to follow in this alimony-property settlement area. Briefly
stated, the steps are:
(1) A division of property acquired by the joint efforts of both
parties. This type of property is acknowledged not to be covered
by the restoration statute3 3 because it is essentially a modem
phenomenon, unforeseen to the framers of our 120 year old
constitution. The standard for such division is that which is just
and reasonable. 34
(2) A decision of whether to award alimony or not is then made.
Factors to be considered:
a. The wife must not be at fault.35
30 "From the standpoint of restoration alone, it is our opinion that this was an
excessive return to [the husband]. Nevertheless, the matter of ultimate importance
is the over-all division, including both property settlement and alimony." Goldstein 31
v. Goldstein, 377 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Ky. 1964).
Heustis v. Heustis, 346 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Ky. 1961)
That a wife who makes the home, raises the chilren, ives succor
and moral support to the husband and aids him in saving an investment
of his money, but who does not directly convert any individual effort or
earnings into the form of property, in the event of divorce has no interest
in the property accumulated through the husband's earnings during the
marriage is a travesty made tolerable only by the judicial power to correct
it in the form of alimony. (emphasis added). See generally, FosrEnFREn at x.
32 (1) If the wife is or should have been granted the divorce, she gets alimony
as a matter of right (ignoring the requirement of insufficiency of her own estate).
(2) Fault is not important in the determination of permanent alimony (ignoring the requirement that she be granted the divorce).
(3) Even if the husband is granted the divorce, if the wife is free from moral
delinquency she is still entitled to one-third of his estate in a lump-sum alimony
and property settlement (confusing the no-fault concept of dividing joint property
with the fault concept of compensation to the wronged wife).
33 Cooke v. Cooke, 449 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Ky. 1969).
3
"Id.,
see 2 NELSON ONDivoRcE § 14.138, at 190 (1961 Revision).
35 The Court says here that this means she must be "entitled" to the divorce,
but a literal interpretation of the statute itself (as the Court seems to be calling for)
would permit alimony to be awarded only "on a divorce obtained by her".
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b. She must not have a sufficient estate of her own. 30
(3) And finally, if the conditions required for the allowance of
alimony are met, the amount of such award must then be
determined. Here the Court allows the trial judge considerable
discretion, as it is he who must hear and balance all the relevant
factors, such as the amount of the husband's estate, the wife's
financial condition, their earning capacities, ages, health, and the
existence of minor children, etc.
Given this basic three-step outline to follow in determining the
financial obligations of the parties to a divorce, it is reasonably clear
that some greater degree of uniformity and adherence to the statutory
language will be achieved at the trial level. But what does this mean
to the average husband and wife in this state who no longer wish to
be married? The conclusion is inescapable that the Court of Appeals
has done nothing to relieve the inequities apparent under the present
state of our divorce law. Bound by that written law, it is admitted
that the Court could not, in Colley, call for total disregard of the
statutes in deference to a more equitable judicial standard;37 but it
would appear that the Court could have taken note of the more glaring
deficiencies in the hope of calling timely legislative attention to the
matter. By failing to do so, it appears the Court is seeking the path
of least resistance in trying to avoid a legislative conflict. In calling
for a return to the 1852 standard, the Court has effectively turned its
back on basic changes in the structure of our society in the past 120
years.3 8 The objectives of continuity and stability in our divorce law
may be achieved, but the cost, in terms of justice denied to the parties
involved, will be high.
Exactly what form this badly needed re-casting of our divorce law
3

6 Insufficient to mean that she is incapable of leading her normal life upon
the interest alone.
S7 But see J. Palmore's concurring opinion in Reed v. Reed, 457 S.W.2d 4, 11
(Ky. 1969):
Despite the literalism of the particular statute, the legislature has also
deliberately vested jurisdiction in matters of divorce and alimony in
equity courts for a long time. That the powers of equity have always been
adapted to meet social problems and changes as they arise is an established tradition which cannot be regarded as completely unknown to the
legislative branch.
38 Without intending to do so, the Court may actually have taken a big first
step toward long needed reform by announcing a return to the literal wording of
the alimony and restoration statutes as they were originally written almost 120
years ago. A conceivable result of such action would be that the trial bench,
suddenly denied the use of the discretionary alternatives built up within the
judiciary since Canine, will find itself bound by a rigid, impossibly outdated set
of rules. Nothing, it seems, could be more conducve to setting the bal eislative process in motion than this potential coalition of frustrated trial judges,
lawyers, husbands and wives.
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should take is a proper matter for extensive legislative debate, and
beyond the scope of this comment. But there is one factor that is
crucial to any meaningful improvement in this field of law videlicet
the elimination of fault as an element of consideration by the Court in
divorce proceedings.3 9 The traditional requirement that one party in
the suit be deemed to be "at fault" has been severely criticized on
several grounds:
(1) Fault is a relative, purely subjective standard, and as such, is
meaningless. 40 It is common for each party to be at least partly responsible for breaking up a marriage, and any effort to base an alimony
award on allocating the fault to one party rather than the other may
result in an extremely inaccurate oversimplification. 4 1
(2) The necessity of establishing fault changes the complexion of
the divorce suit from civil to criminal. Fault necessarily incorporates
the idea of "punishment." If the errant husband is to be punished by
rewarding the suffering wife, he would be better off in a criminal court
where he would have access to the benefit of a jury, due process
procedures, and maximum penalties established by the legislature. "In
contrast, virtual confiscation of property42and judge-set penalty are the
rule in property settlements of divorce."
(3) The requirement that fault be established may actually contribute
to the high divorce rate by making it extremely difficult for the
divided couple to reconcile their differences. One experienced marriage counselor has estimated that half of the couples who initiate
divorce proceedings actually hope something will stop them before it's
39 Foster and Freed, supra note 4, at 85-86, hold the view that more progress
is likely to come in the area of adding non-fault grounds to already existing fault
grounds, than in the abolishment of fault divorce altogether. This is based on the
notorious legislative resistance to change, or if it is inevitable, to change as little
as possible. However, it should be noted that since the publication of that article,
both California and Great Britain have replaced their antiquated fault-oriented
laws with a modem, no-fault approach. See Hayes, California Divorce Reform:
Parting is Sweeter Sorrow, 56 A.B.A.J. 660 (July, 1970).
40 See Winter, supra note 1, where the author stated:
For example, I have represented a number of women who complained
that they were driven crazy by their husband's demands for cleanliness.
One of my client's ex-husbands used to mop the kitchen floor as soon as
he got home. He even went to the point of getting down on his hands and
knees and combing the carpeting in the bedroom. My client felt she was
the laughing stock of the neighborhood because her husband would sweep
the entire street in her block....
Another woman might think this antiseptic man her perfect mate,
particularly after she lived with a slob who only bathed once a month.
Id.
41 at 89-90.
Annot., 1 A.L.R. 3d 28 (1965). See also Hayes, supra note 39, at 660-61.
42
Daggett, Division of Property Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 6 LAw AN
CoNrEMp. PnOB. 225 (1939). See Ploscowe, supra note 4, at 192-93, 200; DoNNELSON,

supra note 6, at 109.
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too late.43 But the need for placing the blame forces both parties to
dredge up long forgotten or forgiven incidents to prove the other
spouse was at fault, effectively stifling any conciliatory lines of com44
munication which might otherwise develop.
(4) The basing of financial obligation after marriage dissolution
upon fault is inherently inequitable, for a "guilty" wife may need help
may be
just as much as the "innocent" one, and a "guilty" husband
45
just as unable to pay the alimony as an "innocent" one.
(5) The assessment of fault upon one of the parties is not at all
requisite to the proper granting of divorce and settlement of financial
responsibilities. All that can be shown by establishing fault is that the
spouses had marital difficulties which were insoluble. Proof of that
46
can clearly be established without making one of the parties to blame.
In recent years, several jurisdictions have re-organized their divorce
laws around this no-fault concept.47 California's century-old laws
based on fault were discarded in 1969 and replaced with a statute
listing only two grounds for divorce--'incurable insanity" and "irreconcilable differences." 48 And in the Divorce Reform Act 1969, the
by refusing to
English Parliament took a surprisingly similar position
49
place the blame of fault on either of the parties.
It is evident that fault as a basis for granting divorce, while
perfectly logical to the ecclesiastical courts of sixteenth and seventeenth
century England, is no longer in accord with the prevailing social
forces in twentieth century America. For the highest court in this
commonwealth to attempt a redefinition of that area of our law without
at least calling attention to the problem of fault is difficult to understand. The need for reform is urgent. Even with a no-fault system,
problems will remain.50 But these could be worked out in a timely
See, e.g., Hofstadter and Herzog supra note 6, at 70.
Hayes, supra note 39, at 660.
45 For a discussion of various factors, other than fault, to be considered in an
award46 for alimony, see 1 A.L.R. 3d 25-27 (1965).
Hayes, supra note 39, at 660.
47 For earlier cases in other jurisdictions, see Fried v. Fried, 84 S.E.2d 576
(Ga. 1954); Richards v. Richards, 355 P.2d 188 (Hawaii 1960); Waters v.
Waters,
48 62 A.2d 250 (Md. 1948).
Hayes, supranote 39, at 660; see WNR, supra note 1, at 40.
49 Levin, The Divorce Reform Act 1969, 33 MOD. L. RFv. 632 (1970).
The 'sole ground' on which a petition for divorce will be granted is that
the 'marriage has broken down irretrievably.' Breakdown will be held to
exist only where petitioner 'satisfies' the court of one of the five facts
or conditions listed in § 2(1). [Adultery, behavior terminating the duty
to cohabit, and three types of separation] . . . It must be emphasized
that the Act does not require proof that the existence of one of the five
conditions was a cause of the marriage breakdown. Indeed it is widely
accepted that matrimonial offenses . . . are generally a symptom not a
of breakdown. Id. at 633-34.
cause
50
See Foster and Freed supra note 4, at 87-88,
48
44
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and efficient manner, once a rational basis for divorce law is established.
Under medieval law there was a kind of rough-and-tumble justice
by ordeal in which the parties stood with their arms crossed over
their breasts and the one who endured the longer was declared
the winner. We are still too close to this kind of justice in our
divorce cases. Alimony will never be an easy problem to solve, but
we can help both husbands and wives by bringing our alimony
customs up to date.51

George A. Smith

Wn APPNc,-PowER OF UN=r
PIZE WMETAPmPIN

STATES ATrORNEY-GENEBAL TO AuTmoWITHOUT JUDICIAL SAcroN.-The Federal Con-

stitution has established, in the Bills of Rights, certain precious and
delicate freedoms which are the heritage of every citizen of the United
States. The founders of this country have entrusted the duty of
interpreting the scope of these rights solely to the judiciary. Being
in the ostensibly objective position of arbiter, the judiciary must
define the nature of each of these personal protections. Perhaps the

most sensitive of these delicate freedoms is the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the fourth amendment.
Conflicts have arisen where a government official in a more or less
subjective position has attempted to define the extent of this freedom.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit faced this
very problem in United States v. United States District Court for the
EasternDistrictof Michigan, Southern Division."
The defendants in this case were indicted for conspiring to commit
the destruction and depredation of government property. 2 Before the
51

Hofstadter and Herzog, supra note 6, at 70.
I No. 71-1105 (6th Cir. April 8, 1971).
2The defendants were indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1964). The pertinent part of section 371 reads:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in
any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Section 1361 reads:
Whoever willfully injures or commits any depredation against any property
of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any
property which has been or is being manufactured or constructed for
the United States, or any department or agency thereof, shall be punished
as follows:
If the damage to such property exceeds the sum of $100, by a fine of not
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both;
(Continued on next page)

